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STATEMENT OF TURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The primary issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial court properly denied 
Spencers3 claim for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, together with vague and 
unspecified damages. A trial courfs denial of an award of attorney fees is a question of law 
which this court reviews for correctness. American Interstate Mortg. Corp. v. Edwards, 
2002 UT App 16,1113, 41 P.3d 1142,1147. 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
42 U.S.C. § 1988 
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 
1981a, 1982,1983,1985, and 1986 of this title, tide IX of Public 
Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 et seq.], the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb et seq.], the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000cc et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
[42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this tide, the 
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the 
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708. 
(1) Any person adversely affected by any decision of a board of 
adjustment may petition the district court for a review of the 
decision. 
(2) In the petition, the plaintiff may only allege that the board 
of adjustment's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
1 
(3)(a) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days 
after the board of adjustment's decision is final. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This litigation arises primarily from a denial by the Pleasant View City Board of 
Adjustment of a request by Appellants Dennis V. Spencer and Linda S. Spencer (the 
"Spencers") to build on two parcels of property accessed only by a private right-of-way. At 
various times, Spencers and/or their successors in interest were granted conditional 
variances to build on the properties. No owner ever went so far as commencing 
construction on the parcels. Spencers eventually regained tide to both parcels. 
Over the years, like all jurisdictions, Pleasant View City modernized its subdivision 
ordinances, establishing new requirements for development and construction of residential 
properties, particularly with respect to requiring minimum frontage on a dedicated public 
street. As a result, Spencers and the City disagreed for some time on what would be 
required for them to build on the parcels. The dealings between Spencers and the City took 
place over an extended period of time from 1983 through 1998. In this litigation, Spencers 
based several of their claims on actions taken by the City or its Board of Adjustment during 
that period, but failed to seek timely review of or remedy for any of those actions within the 
applicable limitations periods. As a result, the trial court correcdy held that those claims 
were time barred. 
Although the Spencers have attempted to elevate this action to a constitutional level 
in an obvious attempt to recover attorney fees, at its essence it remains a simple petition for 
statutory review of the Board of Adjustment decision by the trial court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-708.l In the process of evaluating its position, the City concluded that 
the Spencers had not properly framed or articulated their request to the Pleasant View City 
Board of Adjustment, but under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708, the appropriate remedy if the 
Spencers were to prevail would be a remand of the matter to the Board of Adjustment 
which may have yielded the permits which the Spencers sought. Therefore, as a good faith 
gesture to resolve the dispute, the City agreed to issue two building permits to the Spencers 
which will allow them to proceed with the construction of one residence on each of the two 
parcels, thereby mooting the statutory review. Spencers also alleged several federal and state 
constitutional claims as well as a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 along with a 
claim for attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Finding the central issue to be moot, the 
trial court determined there was no factual or legal basis for the balance of Spencers claims 
and declined to award Spencers attorney fees as the prevailing parties. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Spencers appeared before the Planning Commission and Board of Adjustment many 
times between 1983 and 1998. Though several of the decisions rendered during that period 
were adverse to Spencers, they never sought judicial review of any of those decisions. 
After the July 16, 1998, denial of their application for a variance, Spencers initiated 
this action seeking a declaratory judgment under Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-1, etseq. and 
claiming five constitutional violations including a takings claim, a false arrest and malicious 
1
 The Spencers refer in their brief to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001, but the more 
specific provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708 deal with decision of a Board of 
Adjustment. Section 10-9-1001 is relevant because of the failure of the Spencers to take 
any timely action to seek judicial review of earlier actions of the City within 30 days as 
required by that statutory provision. 
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prosecution claim, an "unjust enrichment and unethical conduct" claim, slander of tide and 
a claimed violation of the Municipal Officers5 and Employees5 Ethics Act. Most of Spencers5 
claims were based upon earlier actions by the City and the Board of Adjustment over the 
1983-1996 period. 
On October 13, 1998, after Spencers commenced discovery, the City sought a 
protective order to stay discovery pending (1) a review, sought by Spencers, of the takings 
claims by the Private Property Ombudsman under Utah Code Ann §§ 63-34-13 and 
§ 78-31a.-l, etseq.^ and (2) the court's review of the Board of Adjustment decision under 
§10-9-708. (R. 094-96.) 
On May 28, 1999, Spencers sought partial summary judgment that the City was 
liable for damages arising from denial of building permits for the East and West Parcels for 
which variances had previously been granted. (R. 101-03.) Four months later, Spencers 
filed a notice to submit and an objection to the City's motion for protective order. (R. 122-
27.) 
In evaluating its position in this litigation, the City concluded that the Spencers had 
failed to properly frame their request before the Board of Adjustment. It determined that if 
the Spencers had properly framed their request as other than an application for a variance, 
the request may have been approved. The City therefore decided that there was no useful 
purpose to be served by either a reconsideration on remand or evaluation of a new, properly 
framed request. In a good faith attempt to resolve the dispute, it decided to tender to 
Spencers one building permit for each of the two (2) parcels. (R. 196-98.) This tender is 
contained within the trial court records and is binding upon the City, mooting the 
§ 10-9-708 review. 
The City filed a motion for summary judgment on the remainder of the Spencers3 
claims surviving after the central issue was mooted. (R. 202-05.) In opposition to the 
City's motion, Spencers submitted the Affidavit of Dennis Spencer (R. 264-333.) which 
contained mostly conclusory statements and legal arguments. The City objected to the 
affidavit and moved to strike it for improper form and as failing to create a genuine issue of 
material fact for summary judgment purposes. (R. 341-43.) 
After several additional filings, the trial court entertained oral argument on all of the 
pending motions. (R. 486.) In a memorandum decision issued on October 2, 2000, the 
court held that (1) the § 10-9-708 review had been mooted by the City's tender of the 
building permits, (2) Spencers3 constitutional claims were unripe, had no factual or legal 
basis and were barred by the running of applicable statutes of limitation; (3) there was no 
first amendment free speech violation; (4) Spencers3 false arrest and malicious prosecution 
claims were barred by governmental immunity; (5) no private cause of action for damages 
exists for violation of the Municipal Ethics Act, the Rules of Professional Conduct or 
Article XI, section 5 of the Utah Constitution; (6) Spencers had not established the factual 
elements required to demonstrate unjust enrichment; (7) no slander of title claim existed; 
and (8) the City's agreement to pay $1,260 in disputed attorney fees mooted that claim. 
The court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and denied Spencers3 motion 
for summary judgment. (R. 503-06.) The final order was entered on November 28, 2000. 
(R. 508-11.) 
s 
Spencers filed with the trial court a Motion to Revise Summary Judgment. (R. 526-
28.) In the accompanying memorandum, Spencers argued that (1) their due process claim 
was self-executing under a subsequendy issued Utah Supreme Court decision; (2) the 
30-day statutes of limitation in §§ 10-9-708 and 10-9-1001 were unreasonable as applied to 
constitutional claims; (3) Spencers5 false arrest and malicious prosecution claims were not 
barred by the governmental immunity act and that Spencers had established the elements of 
those claims; (4) the trial court had "failed to address the core issue of the impact of the 
statutory protection of issued variances to the plaintiffs;" and (5) Spencers were entitled 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to attorney fees as prevailing parties. (R. 515-24.) 
After opposition and reply memoranda had been filed, Spencers filed a notice to 
submit for decision. After briefing, but before a decision had been rendered, the City 
provided the court with supplemental authority from the U.S. Supreme Court, issued on 
May 29, 2001, on the attorney fee issue. (R. 588.) Spencers responded by letter 
attempting to distinguish the supplemental authority, but not arguing that under the new 
standard they were entitled to fees. Spencers sought no oral argument or additional 
opportunity to brief the issue under the newly announced standard. 
Without oral argument, the trial court issued a memorandum decision on Spencers3 
Rule 59 motion. The court ruled that Spademan v. Bd. of Educ. of Box Elder School Dist., 
2000 UT 87, 16 P.3d 533 governed when a constitutional claim arises, but adds nothing to 
Spencers3 claims because the summary judgment had been entered on the basis that 
Spencers had provided no factual or legal basis to support their due process claims. The 
Court also reviewed the Spademan decision in detail and concluded that the facts presented 
by Spencers failed to satisfy the Spademan requirements. The court affirmed its summary 
judgment ruling on the other issues. Addressing the attorney fee question, the court 
concluded that Spencers3 had argued that they were entided to attorneys fees under the 
"catalyst theory35 expressly rejected by Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West 
Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources. 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 
L.Ed.2d 855(2001) and that they were not entitled to § 1988 attorney fees consistent with 
Buckhannon. (R. 595-601.) 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Background Facts 
The following background facts, while perhaps not direcdy relevant or material to 
the narrow legal questions presented to and ruled upon by the trial court, are, however, 
helpful in putting these issues into historical context. 
On May 5, 1971, Spencers obtained the property which is the subject of this 
litigation (the "Property53) as part of a larger 3-V2 acre parcel abutting the rear of a half-acre 
building lot. (R. 004, 008, 170-176.) The Property has been designated by Spencers as 
the West Parcel and the East Parcel. (R. 004.) Spencers divided their 3-V6 acres of land 
into several individual parcels, including the West and East Parcels and conveyed the four 
other parcels to owners of abutting properties to the north. The intent of creating and 
conveying these parcels was for agricultural use by the purchasers. (R. 170-76.) Spencers 
conveyed the western half of the West Parcel in 1981. (R. 004, n. 1.) Title to this portion 
of the Western Parcel passed through other grantees and was conveyed back to Spencers in 
1996. (Id.) 
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By Quit Claim Deed dated May 10, 1983, Paul B. Cragun Investment Company 
granted Spencers a ccnon-exclusive right-of-way for purposes of ingress, egress and utility 
installation and maintenance . . ." (R. 178.) The right-of-way expressly terminates "for 
purposes of ingress and egress, when there is a dedicated road abutting property of the 
grantee along the North line of said right-of-way.53 Id. Much of Spencers3 complaints 
against the City relate to this private right-of-way over which the City has never attempted 
to exercise control. 
Spencers conveyed the eastern half of the West Parcel to John R. and Lola P. Parker 
in 1983. (R. 004.) Spencers and Parkers subsequently applied to the Board of Adjustment 
for a variance to permit Parkers to build on the eastern half of the West Parcel. Their 
application came before the Board of Adjustment on July 11, 1983. The Board voted to 
grant the variance with five conditions, one of which was a favorable legal opinion from the 
City Attorney. (R. 180.) 
By letter dated July 28, 1983, counsel for the City2 advised the Board that dividing 
the original property into parcels without compliance with the City's subdivision ordinance 
made the sale of lots unlawful and that the Board could not approve Spencers3 and Parkers3 
request without requiring compliance with the subdivision ordinance. (R. 182-83.) 
Because the variance condition requiring favorable legal opinion was not satisfied, he City 
refused to issue Parkers a building permit. Spencers3 counsel took the position that because 
the division of the original parcel was intended solely for agricultural purposes and that the 
2This letter actually came from outside counsel to avoid a conflict of interest 
perceived by the Pleasant View City Attorney. 
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first four parcels conveyed were being used as agricultural land, the subdivision ordinance 
did not apply and could not be the basis for denial of the building permit. (R. 170-76.) 
After several months, counsel for the City Planning Commission issued a letter 
concluding that ccif the purchasers of land do not build and indicate it is not their intention 
to [build],35 die division of the land is for agricultural purposes and not subject to the 
subdivision ordinance. (R. 185.) Based upon the conclusion by its counsel, the Planning 
Commission voted on March 20, 1984, to allow Parkers to obtain a building permit. 
(R. 187.) Despite this favorable action by the Commission, Parkers never built on the 
property. 
On March 19, 1986, Spencers applied to the City for a special exception to the 
zoning ordinance to permit them to build on the East Parcel. Their application came before 
the Board of Adjustment on March 31,1986. The Board, after reviewing the decision with 
respect to the Parker application, granted Spencers3 application with four conditions. 
(R. 189.) Spencers took no action to obtain a building permit until 1993. (R. 010.) 
Since 1993 Spencers have attempted to obtain the City's approval to build on the 
Property without having to comply with the requirements of the City's subdivision 
ordinances. Though having their applications consistently denied, Spencers never, prior to 
initiating this action, sought judicial review of the City's decisions as provided by Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 10-9-708 and 10-9-1001. 
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Board of Adjustment Record 
On July 16, 1998, Spencers appeared before the Pleasant View City Board of 
Adjustment. Their request, as identified in the minutes, was: 
Approval for a lot or lots, not having frontage on a street as required 
by the zoning title for the zone in which the subdivision is located, but 
upon a right-of-way. 
(R. 191.) During that meeting, members of the Board posed several questions to 
Mr. Spencer related to the findings which the Board was required to make under Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-9-707(2) and City ordinances before granting a variance from the 
subdivision ordinances. (R. 191-93.) Mr. Spencer failed to explain to the Board what 
hardship justified the request or how his request would or would not affect the interests of 
surrounding landowners or the public. (Id.) In response to questions why a public road 
could not be built and dedicated, "Mr. Spencer says he chooses not to do that.53 (R. 192.) 
At no time during the hearing did Mr. Spencer make it clear that he was seeking 
building permits pursuant to what he believed to be previously granted variances on the two 
parcels. Finding no basis for granting a variance under the statutory requirements based on 
the limited information submitted to them, the Board of Adjustment appropriately voted to 
deny Spencers5 request. (R. 194-95.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Spencers have raised primarily one issue on appeal, i.e., whether they are entitled to 
an award of attorneys fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, together with vague and unspecified 
damages. At the trial court, they argued that they were entitled to fees under the federal 
"catalyst theory55 espoused by several circuit courts. Before the trial court rendered its 
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court released Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West 
Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources. 532 U.S. 598,121 S.Ct. 1835,149 
L.Ed.2d 855(2001) in which it rejected the "catalyst theory" and held that a party was not a 
prevailing party where a defendant had voluntarily changed behavior after the start of 
litigation. Spencers now take a position which they did not take before the trial court, that 
they are prevailing parties under Buckhannon. However, under Buckhannon, Spencers 
cannot be the prevailing parties where the City voluntarily tendered them building permits 
without a court order or other judicial action requiring that they do so. 
With the demise of the "catalyst theory," Spencers may only recover § 1988 attorney 
fees where they have established and prevailed upon a § 1983 claim. That may be done 
only if they can prevail on the merits on a claim that the City deprived them of rights 
secured by the U. S. Constitution or federal law. The trial court correctly found no factual 
or legal support for the Spencers5 federal claims. The myriad state law claims, even if 
established, could not satisfy the requirements to prevail on a § 1983 claim. 
Aside from a dearth of evidence to satisfy the legal requirements for Spencers3 
§ 1983 claims, their federal takings, due process and equal protection claims were unripe as 
a matter of federal law. Because Utah courts follow federal precedent in evaluating federal 
issues, the trial court correctly ruled that Spencers takings, due process and equal protection 
claims could not be advanced. In addition, the bulk of the allegations on which Spencers 
base their federal claims occurred outside the four-year statute of limitation applicable to 
§1983 claims. Those claims are time-barred as a matter of law. 
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Spencers3 state law claims facially fail to satisfy the § 1983 requirement for a right 
protected by the U. S. laws and constitution rather than state law. Spencers have not raised 
as appellate issues the trial court's rulings on any of these claims. However, in an 
abundance of caution and at the risk of irrelevancy, the City elects to address the merits of 
Spencers3 claims on these state law questions. 
Spencers presented no factual evidence to satisfy the requirements to claim damages 
under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. In fact, much of the evidence indicates 
that Spencers3 failure to obtain their building permits was due in large part to their failure to 
articulate their request in a manner which would result in an evaluation of what they 
wanted as opposed to what they actually requested. At most, there was a good faith dispute 
between the parties as to whether the City had granted variances attaching to the land 
which were not subject to the City's updated ordinances. The City's actions in this 
confusing situation are not the type of activity which constitutes a flagrant violation of well-
established constitutional rights. 
Similarly, Spencers provided no evidence to avoid summary judgment on their 
Article I, Section 22 claim. At a minimum, they had to establish that they had been denied 
all reasonable uses of their land. The trial court properly found there was no evidentiary 
support for this claim. 
The Spencers' Article XL, Section 5 claim fails as a matter of law. This constitutional 
provision does not create a private right of action and has historically been used to 
invalidate an ordinance which conflicts with state law. Spencers did not seek to invalidate 
any ordinance. 
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Municipalities are immune from slander of title claims. Spencers5 argument that 
immunity is waived for a quiet title action does not even address, much less alter, the 
governmental immunity for libel and slander actions. Even if the City were not immune, 
Spencers failed to provide any evidentiary basis for their slander of title claim. 
ARGUMENT 
I. SPENCERS WERE NOT PREVAILING PARTIES UNDER 
CONTROLLING FEDERAL LAW. 
Spencers argue that they are prevailing parties under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 because the 
litigation produced a material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties, citing 
Buckhannon Bd. and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human 
Resources. 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855(2001). At the outset, it is 
important to note that Spencers did not make this argument to the trial court. The 
Buckhannon opinion was published after the parties3 motions had been briefed and argued. 
The City brought the case to the attention of the trial court by letter, enclosing a copy of 
the opinion. (R. 588.) Spencers responded with a letter attempting to distinguish 
Buckhannon, but not arguing how they might be entitled to fees under the material 
alteration theory clarified in Buckhannon. Spencers did not seek opportunity to brief or 
present oral argument on the issue. 
It is well-established that a party may not raise an issue for the first time upon 
appeal. E.g., Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 767 (Utah 1987). The only 
exceptions are where a trial court's ruling constituted plain error or there are exceptional 
circumstances which justify addressing the issue for the first time on appeal. State v. 
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Cramer. 2002 UT 9,11 34, 44 P.3d 690, 698-99. This Court has clarified what steps are 
necessary for preserving a substantive issue for appeal. 
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party must timely bring 
the issue to the attention of the trial court, thus providing the court an 
opportunity to rule on the issue's merits. Issues not raised in the trial 
court in timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding the appellate 
court from considering their merits on appeal. Second, the issue must 
be specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiendy raised to a level 
of consciousness before the trial court. Third, the party must 
introduce to the trial court supporting evidence or relevant legal 
authority to support its argument. 
Hart v. Salt Lake County Common. 945 P.2d 125, 129-30 (Utah App. 1997) (punctuation, 
citations omitted). The Hart court noted that merely mentioning an issue in the pleadings 
or raising an issue in post-trial motions do not preserve the issue for appeal. Id. 
Under die Hart standard, Spencers have failed to preserve this argument for appeal. 
As a result, it is appropriate for this Court to follow its precedent to decline to address the 
argument. 
Even if they had preserved the issue, Spencers have not satisfied the legal 
requirements for an award of attorney fees under Euckhannon. The question presented to 
the Supreme Court in Buckhannon was whether the term "prevailing party" included a 
party that achieved its desired result because its lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in 
the defendant's behavior prior to judicial resolution of the plaintiffs claims, rendering the 
claims moot. Buckhannon 532 U.S. 600,121 S.Ct. 1838. Under the controversial 
"catalyst theory35 several federal circuit courts had held that the voluntary change was 
sufficient to confer prevailing party status. The Supreme Court rejected the catalyst theory, 
holding that a defendant's "voluntary change in conduct" did not cause the "alteration in the 
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legal relationship of the parties53 required for prevailing party status, expressly rejecting the 
catalyst theory. Id. 532 U.S. 605, 121 S.Ct. 1840. In order to qualify as materially altering 
the legal relationship between the parties, that change must be a "judicially sanctioned 
change.55 Id. The court noted that a "non-judicial alteration of actual circumstances55 has 
never been the basis for awarding attorney's fees under a prevailing party theory. Id. It 
expressly held that "[a] defendant's voluntary change in conduct, although perhaps 
accomplishing what the plaintiff sought to achieve by the lawsuit, lacks the necessary 
judicial imprimatur on the change.55 Id. 
It is that "judicial imprimatur55 which is lacking in this case. The Buckhannon court 
noted that the imprimatur comes from a judgment on the merits and by a consent decree, 
but expressed skepticism that a private settlement agreement between the parties was 
sufficient. Several federal courts since Buckhannon have held that an express settlement is 
sufficient to grant prevailing party status. None, however, has found the necessary 
imprimatur where a defendant unilaterally and voluntarily changed conduct after 
commencement of litigation. In fact, the Tenth Circuit has found that Buckhannon 
precludes an award of attorney fees where a defendant discontinued a challenged practice 
after the suit was filed. Griffin v. Steeltek, Inc.. 261 R3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2001). See also 
Booth v. Barton County. 157F.Supp.2d 1178, 1184 (D.Kan 2001) (denying § 1988 fees 
where defendant voluntarily improved inmate conditions which were being challenged). 
The City's grant of Spencers5 building permits and related actions was voluntary and 
did not involve adjudication of the issues or judicial action by the trial court. The City's 
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actions simply rendered the issues moot. Under controlling federal precedent, the trial 
court correctly ruled that Spencers simply were not the prevailing parties in this litigation.3 
II. SPENCERS FAILED TO PLEAD AND ESTABLISH A CLAIM UNDER 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 WHICH WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO ATTORNEY 
FEES UNDER § 1988. 
To be entitled to attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Spencers were required to 
plead and establish a § 1983 claim. E.g., Americans United for Separation of Church &: 
State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 835 F.2d 727 (6th Cir 1987) (the failure to make 
and prevail on a § 1983 claim precludes an award of fees). To state a claim under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that "the defendant has deprived 
him of a right secured by the 'Constitution and Laws' of the United States.33 Meade v. 
Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1526 (10th Cir. 1988)(emphasis added). To have a federally 
protected property right "a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire 
for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a 
legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 
2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). See also Holmes v. Finney. 631 F.2d 150, 154-55 
(10th Cir. 1980) ("a plaintifFs claim under § 1983 . . . must be grounded on the violation of 
a right of substance and not merely on a theoretical speculation that some right has been 
infringed. . . . [A] federal constitutional question must exist not in mere form, but in 
substance, and not in mere assertion, but in essence and effect.55) 
3Utah courts must follow federal law in analyzing federal claims. Broadbent v. Bd. 
ofEduc, 910 P.2d 1274, 1279 (Utah App. 1996) cert, denied 917 P.2d 556 (ccSince the 
United States Supreme Court has supremacy on issues of federal law, it is proper that state 
courts follow its lead in federal matters.55) 
i £ 
As a threshold matter, § 1983, while protecting federal constitutional interests, may 
not, under federal law, ordinarily form the basis of review of local zoning and planning 
disputes. Raskiewicz v. Town of New Boston, 754 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing 
Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822 (1st Cir, cert, denied, 459 U.S. 
989,103 S.Ct. 345, 74 L.Ed.2d 385 (1982)). The rationale behind this position is that 
every land use decision in some way affects a protected right. If automatic § 1983 claims 
were available, every routine land use decision challenged by a property owner would 
become a federal question. 
Such a claim is too typical of the run of the mill dispute between a 
developer and a town planning agency, regardless of... 
characterizations ... of defendants5 alleged mental states, to rise to the 
level of a due process violation. The authority ... suggest that the 
conventional planning dispute--at least when not tainted with 
fundamental procedural irregularity, racial animus, or the like-which 
takes place within the framework of an admittedly valid state 
subdivision scheme is a matter primarily of concern to the state and 
does not implicate the Constitution. This would be true even were 
planning officials to clearly violate, much less "distort" the state 
scheme under which they operate. ... Every appeal by a disappointed 
developer from an adverse ruling by a local... planning board 
necessarily involves some claim that the board exceeded, abused or 
"distorted55 its legal authority in some manner, often for some allegedly 
perverse (from the developer's point of view) reason. It is not enough 
simply to give these state law claims constitutional labels such as "due 
process55 or "equal protection55 in order to raise a substantial federal 
question under section 1983. 
Creative Environments at 833 (emphasis added).4 
4See also Norton v. Village of Corrales. 103 F.3d 928, 933 (10th Cir. 1996) 
("Federal courts should be reluctant to interfere in zoning disputes which are local 
concerns.55); Gunkel v. City of Emporia. 835 F.2d 1302,1304 (10th Cir.1987) (federal 
courts do not sit as [a] "zoning board[ ] of appeals" to resolve municipal zoning disputes); 
Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes. 997 F.2d 1369, 1389 (11th Cir. 1993) (courts "should 
be most circumspect in determining that constitutional rights are violated in quarrels over 
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Moreover, while the use and ownership of property are fundamental rights, a 
property owner has no vested property right in a contemplated development or entitlement 
to a particular zoning. Marshall v. Bd. of County Commissioners, 912 F.Supp 1456, 1464 
(D. Wyo 1996); Tacobs. Visconsi & Tacobs Co. v. City of Lawrence, 715 F.Supp. 1000, 
1004-05 (D. Kan. 1989); MacDonakt Sommer &: Frates v. Yolo County. 477 U.S. 340, 
348-351, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2566-2567, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986); Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council 505 U.S. 1003, 1013-19, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2892-2895, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 
(1992). Only after the federally protected property interest is identified may the court 
proceed to determine whether the alleged abuse of that interest is sufficient to raise the issue 
to constitutional proportions. Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1374 
(11th Cir.1993), cm. denied, 933 U.S. 1018,114 S.Ct. 1400,128 L.Ed.2d 73 (1994). 
A § 1983 claim is not presented by a statutory review of a municipal land use 
decision. Even if the common nucleus of facts might support a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff has 
the burden to establish the infringement of a recognized constitutional right or the existence 
of a federal statutory protection of which he has been deprived. 
Spencers based their federal claims, in large part, on allegations of impropriety 
dating back into the early 1980s. They may not, however, base a § 1983 claim on any 
actions which occurred prior to August 6,1994, four years prior to the commencement of 
zoning decisions."); Albery v. Reddig. 718 F.2d 245 (7th Cir.1983) ( courts should not 
become accustomed to idea that constitutional rights are implicated in quarrel over zoning 
rales); Paul v. Davis. 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976) (not every 
violation of state law gives rise to a constitutional action under § 1983). 
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this action. See Mismash v. Murray City, 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
Utah's four-year catchall statute applies to § 1983 actions). 
Although as previously indicated, the City is hesitant to address issues not adequately 
preserved or briefed, Spencers3 argument regarding variances running with the land under 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-707(4) merits at least brief mention. In addition to the statute of 
limitations problem more fully discussed above, both Spencers and the other prior owners 
failed to timely apply for building permits on those parcels and therefore satisfy the 
"reasonable diligence33 requirement imposed by Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of 
Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 396 (Utah 1980). They also failed to take any action to seek timely 
judicial review of those decisions whether under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708 or 
§ 10-9-1001. Beyond that, the doctrine of laches also applies and was expressly mentioned 
by the trial court in ruling on these issues, which appropriately found that Spencers are 
trying to couch their claims in constitutional terms to avoid the obvious application of those 
limiting provisions. (R. 595-601). 
Also, Spencers3 federal takings, due process and equal protection claims were unripe 
for judicial determination. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton 
Bank of Tohnson City. 473 U.S. 172, 195 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 3121 n. 13, 87L.Ed.2d 
126 (1985). The issue of ripeness goes to the heart of whether a court has jurisdiction 
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. Bateman v. City of West Bountiful, 89 F.3d 
704, 706 (10th Cir. 1996). Under federal law, a land use case is not ripe for determination 
of federal issues until (1) there is a final determination by the decision maker and (2) the 
plaintiff has applied for and been denied a judicial remedy under state law. Bateman at 
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707-08. These ripeness requirements apply to all federal takings, due process and equal 
protection claims arising from the same facts and circumstances. 
[D]ue process and equal protection claims stand on no firmer 
jurisdictional footing. The Tenth Circuit repeatedly has held that the 
ripeness requirement of Williamson applies to due process and equal 
protection claims that rest upon the same facts as a concomitant 
takings claim. 
Bateman at 709 (citing multiple Tenth Circuit and Supreme Court cases). As a matter of 
law, the due process and equal protection claims are subsumed into the more particularized 
takings claim. Id. citing Miller v. Campbell County, 945 F.2d 348, 352-353 (10th 
Cir.1991). As a result, Spencers5 federal takings, due process and equal protection claims 
were unripe and could not support a § 1983 claim. 
III. SPENCERS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THEIR DUE PROCESS CLAIMS 
BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT. 
Spencers make a series of convoluted arguments for which they provided no 
evidentiary basis before the trial court. To begin with, they argue that their due process 
rights were violated because the City required them to resolve an access problem allegedly 
created by the City. In this context, it is important to note that Spencers never timely 
sought judicial review of the actions which they claim created the problem. The road access 
issue which Spencers highlight deals with a private road in Cherrywood and a right-of-way 
owned by Spencers. Spencers5 unilateral anticipation of a public road to be built over the 
right-of-way does not provide the basis of a due process claim. In any event, there was no 
evidence presented to the trial court to support this claim and nothing but conclusory 
argument is presented here. 
on 
On page 29 of their brief, Spencers make an argument which was never presented to 
the trial court nor supported here by any evidence, i.e., that the actions of the City were 
undertaken for private rather than public good. Spencers cite to R. 284, the affidavit of 
Dennis Spencer, which provides no factual basis for this argument. 
I asked to have Teri Cragun removed from being involved in the 
approval of my property because she had a personal interest in 
Cherrywood and her family owns property there. I indicated that the 
City had allowed Terri Cragun to use her official position to benefit 
her family's development of the Cherrywood development at my 
expense. 
(R. 284 11 d.) This type of conclusory statement in an affidavit does not create an issue of 
fact. E.£f., Trcloggan v. Treloggan. 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985) ("Unsubstantiated 
opinions and conclusions" are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.") As a 
result of this and other deficiencies, the City moved to strike the affidavit of Dennis 
Spencer. (R. 341-343.) Spencers provided no evidence of a taking, much less a taking of 
property for private use. This claim for relief does not satisfy the requirements for stating a 
§ 1983 claim. 
Spencers make another argument not presented to the trial court; that "actions were 
not related to rationale proffered for conduct." They cite to R. 248 to show that they made 
the argument before the trial court, but a review of that page and the pages preceding and 
succeeding it reveal no such argument. Nor do Spencers provide any evidence here to 
support that argument. For example, they refer to a decision by the City Engineer that no 
building lot could be approved on Spencers' property "contrary to earlier representations." 
There is no clue what those "earlier representations" might be. Spencers' citation to City of 
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey. 526 U.S. 687, 119 S.Ct. 1624, 143 L.Ed.2d 
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882 (1999) is unhelpful. In Del Monte Dunes, the factual record had been well-developed 
before the trial court and justified the holding. Here, Spencers made no effort to 
demonstrate facts which would preclude summary judgment, much less fully develop the 
factual record. There was certainly no basis for the trial court to conclude that Spencers had 
established a § 1983 claim which would entitle them to § 1988 attorney fees. 
IV. SPENCERS CLAIMS BASED UPON THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND 
LAW DO NOT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR EITHER DAMAGES OR AN 
AWARD OF § 1988 ATTORNEY FEES. 
Spencers argue that they have a claim for damages under the Utah Constitution and 
for slander of title. These claims do not fall within rights protected by the Constitution and 
Laws of the United States. These are facially and expressly state law claims. Even if these 
claims were established, they may not be the basis of a § 1983 claim and therefore not give 
rise to § 1988 attorney fees. 
A. SPENCERS5 ALLEGATIONS DO NOT SUPPORT A CLAIM FOR 
DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION.5 
Spencers correctly identify the three requirements to establish a claim for damages 
under Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. See Spackman v. Bd. of Educ. of Box 
Elder School Dist.. 2000 UT 87,11H 23-25, 16 P.3d 533, 538-39. However, they failed 
before the trial court to adduce evidence to satisfy the three requirements. In a summary 
judgment proceeding, a plaintiff has the burden to come forth with evidence which, if 
5Spencers have not alleged error by the trial court in its ruling on their state law 
claims nor have they expressly identified these matters as issues for appellate review. Even 
so, the tenor of dieir arguments implies a challenge to those rulings. From an 
overabundance of caution, the City feels compelled to address those arguments. 
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believed, would support the elements of the alleged claim. Tensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 
944 P.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997). Before the trial court and here, Spencers simply make 
conclusory arguments that the three elements have been satisfied. The facts simply do not 
support these conclusory arguments. 
It is illustrative to note the proceedings before the City's Board of Adjustment on 
Spencers3 application for a variance from the subdivision ordinances, the proceeding which 
ultimately gave rise to this action. After identifying the requirements for the Board to 
approve the variance, Mr. Spencer was afforded the opportunity to make the requisite 
showings. He failed to explain to the Board what hardship justified the request or how his 
request would or would not affect the interests of surrounding landowners or the public. 
When asked specifically why a public road could not be built and dedicated in satisfaction of 
the subdivision ordinance, Mr. Spencer simply answered that he chose not to do so. 
Lacking any showing sufficient to satisfy the requirements imposed upon the Board, it 
denied Spencers3 application. Ironically, the Board would have acted in an arbitrary and 
capricious fashion by granting Spencers the variance without any support for the statutorily 
required criteria. This hardly satisfies the requirement for flagrance specified in Spademan. 
Moreover, a large part of the problem, recognized by the City after this litigation 
commenced, is that Spencers did not properly frame their request as one for a building 
permit under previously granted, and what Spencers believed to be still valid, variances. 
Spencers were looking for apples and the Board thought they were looking for oranges. In 
other words, the problem was equally attributable to Spencers. This was not a board acting 
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to violate Spencers3 rights, but a board acting consistendy in response to what it reasonably 
believed Spencers' application to be. 
In addition, there is no evidence of a clearly established constitutional right of which 
a reasonable person would have known. Based upon the documented history between 
Spencer and the City, there was a good faith dispute over whether there existed a variance 
which was not subject to the City's updated subdivision ordinance provisions. If there 
existed a constitutional right, it did not rise to the level that a reasonable official would 
understand that the action being taken violates that right. The scope of "flagrant" action 
does not include "human frailties of forgetfulness, distractability, or misjudgment." 
Spackman 1f 23 at 538. 
Moreover, the Spackman court expressly deferred to legislative judgment in stating 
that there must be no existing remedy to redress the constitutional injury. Spackman 1f 24 
at 538-39. In fact, the narrow statutory review of the City's Board of Adjustment decision 
under Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-708 is exactly the type of remedy which falls within the 
scope identified by the Spackman court. Given that there was a specific legal remedy, it is 
not even necessary to look to the existence of a remedy in the Utah Constitution. 
B. SPENCERS FAILED TO PROVIDE THE TRIAL COURT WITH 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THEIR ARTICLE I, SECTION 22 
CLAIM. 
The crux of Spencers3 argument before the trial court was that the City's refusal to 
issue a building permit "constituted a permanent or recurring interference with property 
rights." (R. 251.) That is an insufficient basis to state, much less prove an Article I, 
id 
Section 22 claim. Utah law recognizes that municipalities may regulate property uses 
without constituting a taking of the property. 
Many statutes and ordinances regulate what a property owner can do 
with and on the owner's property. Those regulations may have a 
significant impact on the utility or value of the property, yet they 
generally do not require compensation under article I, section 22. 
Only when governmental cation rises to the level of a taking or 
damage under article I, section 22 is the State required to pay 
compensation. 
Colman v. Utah State Land BcL 795 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah 1990). 
The City has taken no action to acquire Spencers3 land under its power of eminent 
domain or to physically occupy the property. There is^ therefore, no forthright taking for 
which plaintiff would be entitled to compensation. JB.^ T., Call v. City of West Tordaa 606 
P.2d 217, 220 (Utah 1979). Where there is no physical occupation, Spencer must establish 
a regulatory talcing by demonstrating that regulation of its property uses "goes too far" with 
the result that it will be recognized as a taking. To establish this type of regulatory taking, 
Spencers must demonstrate that the City deprived them of all economically viable use of the 
property. Nat'l Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 925 
(Utah 1993). 
[F]or there to be a taking under a zoning ordinance, the landowner 
must show that he has been deprived of all reasonable uses of his land. 
For example, almost all zoning decisions have some economic impact 
on property values. However, mere diminution in property value is 
insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating a taking by 
regulation. 
Cornish Town v. Roller, 817 P.2d 305, 311-12 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). Even if 
Spencers alleged a temporary taking, they must demonstrate a loss of all economically viable 
use for the period. Cornish at 312. 
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Spencers provided the trial court with no evidence to establish, under controlling 
Utah law, an Article I, Section 22 taking. The trial court properly granted the City 
summary judgment on that claim. 
C. SPENCERS5 CLAIMS OF VIOLATION OF ARTICLE XI, 
SECTION 5 PROVIDE THEM NO BASIS FOR RELIEF. 
Spencers argue in conclusory fashion that the City violated Article XI, Section 5 of 
the Utah Constitution, entitling them to "seek equitable enforcement of Article Xt § 5 
against the City. (Spencers3 Brief p. 27.) They give us no indication what this "equitable 
enforcement35 may be. The argument fails. See Springville Citizens for a Better Community 
v. Springville City. 1999 UT 25,11 21, n. 2, 979 P.2d 332, 336 (a plaintiffs constitutional 
claims must be factually and legally supported and may not rest on "self-evident" interests). 
Article XI, Section 5 is known as the "supremacy clause.55 There is no language in 
Article XL, Section 5 which creates a private right of action. Nor does the case law 
discussing that constitutional provision give any indication of a private right of action. 
Simply stated, the provision empowers municipal governments and limits their power to 
legislate to areas not in conflict with state law. E.JJ.J Allgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530, 531 
(Utah 1976). The sole remedy under this provision would be to hold an ordinance 
unconstitutional where it conflicts with state statute. State By and Through Hansen v. Salt 
Lake City. 445 P.2d 691, 693 (Utah 1968). Spencers did not challenge the 
constitutionality of any legislative action by the City. They were entitled to no other cause 
of action based upon Article Xt, Section 5. The trial court properly so ruled. 
D. SPENCERS WERE UNABLE TO ESTABLISH THEIR SLANDER 
OF TITLE CLAIM BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT, 
The City is immune under the governmental immunity act from an action for 
slander of title. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act requires that we address three 
questions in determining whether a governmental entity is immune 
from suit. First, was the activity the entity performed a governmental 
function and therefore immunized from suit by the general grant of 
immunity . . .Second, if the activity was a governmental function, has 
some other section of the Act waived that blanket of immunity? 
Third, if the blanket immunity has been waived, does the Act also 
contain an exception to that waiver which results in a retention of 
immunity against the particular claim asserted in this case? 
Ledfors v. Emery County School District. 849 P2d 1162,1164 (Utah 1993). 
The City was at all times performing governmental functions in its dealings with 
Spencers. As a result, those claims are barred unless Spencers can establish that immunity 
was waived. There is no waiver with respect to slander of title. In fact, slander in general is 
expressly excepted from the waiver of immunity for tortious conduct in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-30-10(2). Assuming that the City's actions can in some way be construed as 
negligent, those actions are nonetheless also immune under Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(1) 
[discretionary functions] and (3) [issuance or denial of permits]. Spencers' slander of title 
claim is therefore barred by the governmental immunity act. 
Spencers have argued here that they can make their slander of tide claim based upon 
the waiver of immunity for quiet tide actions. (Spencers Brief p. 38.)6 This waiver of 
immunity affords Spencers no relief from the immunity for the slander of title claim. First, 
^This argument is made for the first time on appeal and need not be addressed by the 
Court. See discussion above. 
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slander of title is a tort claim while a quiet tide action is an in rem or quasi-in rem action 
which only determines the interests of named parties in an identified property. Second, the 
City claims no interest in Spencers property or easement rights. 
Even if governmental immunity did not bar Spencers5 slander of tide claims, they 
failed to provide any factual or legal basis for a slander of title action against the City. To 
establish slander of title, Spencers were required to make four showings: (1) publication of 
a slanderous statement; (2) that the statement was false; (3) that the statement was made 
with malice; and (4) actual or special damages. Bass v. Planned Management Services, Inc., 
761 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1988) CCA slanderous statement is one that is derogatory or 
injurious to the legal validity of an owner's title or to his or her right to sell or hypothecate 
the property/5 Id. A search of case law reveals no opinions in which a municipality's land 
use decisions have been treated as slanderous statements. The City did nothing to prevent 
Spencers from transferring tide to their property. Spencers presented no evidence of any 
slanderous statements with respect to Spencers5 title to either property or recorded any 
documents which amount to false publication. Spencers presented no evidence, merely 
conclusory arguments, of malice. CCA published false statement. . . does not constitute 
slander of title widiout the element of malice.55 First Security Bank v. Banberry Crossing, 
780 P.2d 1253, 1257 (Utah 1989). 
Nor did Spencers make any allegations or present evidence of actual or special 
damages. In a slander of title action "presumed or general damages55 are insufficient. Id. 
"A slander of title action requires proof of actual or special damages.55 Id. 
The special damage rule requires the plaintiff to establish pecuniary 
loss that has been realized or liquidated. Proof of special damages 
no 
usually involves demonstrating a sale at a reduced price or at greater 
expense to the seller. It is not sufficient to show that the land's value 
has dropped on the market, as this is general damage, not a realized or 
liquidated loss. 
Valley Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders. Inc., 944 P.2d 361, 364 (Utah 1997) 
(punctuation, citations omitted). Spencers failed to plead or factually establish their slander 
of title claims against the City. They were required to do so to avoid summary judgment. 
lensen supra. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on Spencers3 slander of 
title claims. 
CONCLUSION 
This action is, in reality, a simple petition for statutory review of a Board of 
Adjustment decision. The need for that review was rendered moot by the City's voluntary 
and unilateral action in tendering the building permits which the Spencers were seeking. 
Spencers did not sufficiently plead or provide factual support for either a § 1983 claim 
which would entitle them to attorney fees under § 1988 or damages under the Utah 
Constitution and law. The City's voluntary action to allow the Spencers to obtain two 
building permits for the parcels of property in question as a good faith gesture to resolve the 
litigation does not carry the judicial imprimatur necessary to establish a material alteration 
of the legal relationship between the parties. Under governing federal law, the trial court 
correctly denied Spencers5 § 1988 attorney fee request. 
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